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Abstract
In this paper, we experimentally compare the e¤ect of costless direct and indirect messages
on the risky action choices, hence on coordinations in stag-hunt games. We show that there
is no e¤ect of costless indirect messages on the frequency of risky action choices and hence on
coordination on the payo¤-dominant equilibrium. With direct messages, however, we nd that
there is a signicant e¤ect of pre-play communication on e¢ cient coordination. One potential
reason of not seeing a signicant e¤ect of indirect messages is the di¤erence in agentsmessage-
interpretations. Another potential reason may be the existence of lie-averse agents.
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1 Introduction
Incomplete information exists in many interactions. In these interactions people may use signals to
convey some information about themselves to their opponents. The framed degree in your doctors
o¢ ce, the celebrity endorsement of a popular dietician, and the pictures of politicians on the wall
of a restaurant are all signals. The signals are potentially valuable because they allow you to infer
useful information. These signals are indirect and require interpretation. They may be subject
to manipulation. The doctors diploma tells you something about the doctors qualications, but
knowing where and when the doctor studied does not prove that she is a good doctor.
This paper analyzes the outcome of a stag-hunt game with pre-play one way costless communi-
cation. One of the players, sender, is given the chance to either signal his risk attitude or tell which
action he would choose to the other player before playing the game. As the signals mentioned in
the rst paragraph, the signal about the players risk attitude is indirect and requires interpretation
whereas the latter is direct and requires no interpretation. Such an indirect signal is important for
the game when the payo¤s from the game are monetary and strategic risk exists in the game. In
a stag-hunt game, players choose between strategically safe and risky actions (respectively, Action
A and Action B in Table 1). Depending on a players own action choice as well as her opponents
action choice, they may end up in the payo¤-dominant equilibrium ((Action B, Action B)), in the
risk-dominant equilibrium ((Action A, Action A)), or out of equilibrium ((Action A, Action B),
(Action B, Action A)).
Table 1: 2x2 Stag-Hunt Game
Action A Action B
Action A a; a a; c
Action B c; a b; b
b > a > c > 0
An indirect signal about a players risk attitude may a¤ect a players action (hence the game
outcome) for the following reasons: Agentsutility representations di¤er according to their risk
aversion.1 In the game, risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-loving agents expect di¤erent payo¤s
from Action A (or Action B) for the same belief about the other persons action choice. Hence,
1Some earlier studies (Bolton, 1998; Camerer, 1997; Holt and Laury, 2002; Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey, 2002) show
deviations from the equilibrium predictions in experimental results when subjectsrisk attitudes are not taken into
account for the payo¤s.
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their optimal action choices may change as a response to their beliefs: It may be optimal for a risk-
averse agent to choose Action A even when she thinks that her opponent chooses Action A with a
low probability. On the other hand, it may be optimal for a risk-loving agent to choose Action A
only when she thinks that her opponent chooses Action A with a high probability. This di¤erence
stems from the concave (convex) utility function of a risk-averse (risk-loving) agent. Similarly,
when a player gets a signal about how risk averse the other person is, she may form her beliefs
accordingly. She may expect a risk-averse (risk-loving) opponent to choose Action A with a higher
(lower) probability and best respond to her belief by choosing Action A (Action B).
A direct signal, simply saying which action a player intends to take before playing the game, is
di¤erent than indirect signal. For direct messages, Farrell and Rabin (1996) state that in order to
have a message to be credible in a game, the message should hold two properties: self-committing
and self-signaling. A signal is self-committing when it creates an incentive for the sender to fulll
it if it is believed by the receiver. For instance, consider a cheap talk situation for the game in
Table 1. Row players message saying that he will take Action B in the game, is self-committing, if
the row player thinks that the receiver (column player) believes this message (he will take Action
B) then row player best responds to that by choosing Action B. A signal is self-signaling if the
sender sends it if it is true. The row player sends a message saying that he will take Action B in
the game only if he really plans to do it. Since one cannot understand from the message whether it
is true or not, the message is not self-signaling in such a game. Aumann (1990) states that cheap
talk should be ignored when the message is not self-signaling. Nevertheless, although messages
may not be self-signaling, in coordination games as in Table 1, cheap talk increases coordination
levels (Charness, 2000; Cooper et al., 1992; Clark, Kay and Sefton, 2001; Du¤y and Feltovich,
2002, 2006).2 For indirect messages, self-committing signal means that the sender chooses the risky
action if the sender believes that his message about his risk lovingness will convince receiver to
choose the risky action. Self-signaling signal means that only sender sends that he is risk loving
(message)if he aims to choose the risky action.
This paper compares the e¤ect of an indirect signal through which the receiver interprets how
likely the senders risky action choice with a direct signal through which the receiver gets a sure
2Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990, 1991), Cooper et al. (1990, 1992), and Straub (1995) show that subjects
may not always coordinate on the payo¤-dominant equilibrium. The result from this literature is that when players
do not communicate, mostly Pareto-dominated equilibrium is observed as the game outcome, with the use of pre-play
messages mostly Pareto-e¢ cient outcome is observed.
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message about the senders risky action choice. In particular, we compare coordination rates/risky
action choices in the stag-hunt games with pre-play communication for two cases: 1) sender says
how risk lover or how risk averse he is to his opponent (indirect message). 2) sender is simply
saying which action he wants to take (direct message).
To see the e¤ect of sending direct or indirect messages compared to the baseline, we design
an experiment with three stages. In the rst stage, we use a common technique (due to Holt and
Laury, 2002) to elicit subjectsrisk aversion. This technique involves two lotteries: one risky and
one safe. The riskiness of the lotteries is determined by the di¤erence between the high and low
payo¤s. There are ten di¤erent situations and individuals are asked at which situation they want to
switch from a safelottery to a riskylottery. At a given situation the probability of obtaining the
high payo¤ is identical in both lotteries. These probabilities range from 1/10 to 1 in increments of
1/10 between situations. The expected payo¤ of the risky lottery becomes higher than the expected
payo¤ of the safe lottery after Situation 5. Depending on agentsbeing risk loving, risk averse, or
risk neutral, they can switch from the safe lottery to the risky lottery before, after, or at Situation
5, respectively.3
The second stage di¤ers according to treatment. We have three treatments including baseline
in the experiment. In the rst treatment of the experiment, senders have a chance to signal their
risk-aversion levels4 to the receivers before playing the game in Table 2. In the second treatment,
senders have a chance to tell which action they would like to choose to the receivers before playing
the game in Table 2. In the baseline treatment, subjects play the game in Table 2 without a
communication stage.
In the treatments, the subject group is divided into two: one group is composed of senders and
the other group is composed of receivers. Senders and receivers are matched to play the game in
Table 2. However, before playing the game, in the rst treatment, senders are asked to choose one
of the following: "I do not want to send a message" or a message saying which group they belong
to. If a sender switched from Option A to Option B in situations 1, 2, 3, and 4 in the rst stage,
she belongs to Group 1; if she switched from Option A to Option B in situations 5, 6 and 7 in the
rst stage, she belongs to Group 2, and if she switched from Option A to Option B in situations
8, 9 and 10 in the rst stage, she belongs to Group 3. In the second treatment, before playing
3For more information about this stage, please see Part 1 in the Appendix.
4 In the experiment, we do not directly say the risk attitude; instead we ask information about the senders choice
in the rst stage.
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the game, senders are asked to choose one of the following: "I do not want to send a message", a
message saying they would choose Action A in the game, and a message saying they would choose
Action B in the game. In either treatment, senders and receivers know that senders do not need
to send the true message about which group they actually belong to or choose the action they told
they would choose. In the third stage, senders and receivers play the game in Table 2 with their
matches.
Table 2: The Experimental Stag-Hunt Game
Action A Action B
Action A 570; 570 570; 70
Action B 70; 570 770; 770
We show that Aumanns conjecture is still valid for indirect messages. Indirect messages are
considered as a cheap talk and does not signicantly increase e¢ cient coordination levels. However,
our ndings related to direct messages are inline with the experimental economics literature: direct
cheap talk messages increase the e¢ cient coordination levels. Our main contribution is to show
that the structure of the cheap talk is also important to increase coordination in stag-hunt games.
We also show that subjects learn to coordinate on the e¢ cient equilibrium with direct messages.
However, this learning process does not occur with indirect messages. We observe truth telling
behavior in all treatments. In indirect message treatment, most subjects belong to Group 2 or
Group 3 and they may choose to send a message saying that they are in Group 1. This type
of strategic message would not hurt the receiver and would increase e¢ cient coordination levels.
Only 27% of the time subjects were strategic when sending a message and send a risk group
message di¤erent than the actual risk group they belong to, i.e., they send messages telling that
they belong to one of the extreme groups (Group 1 or Group 3) to increase coordination either on
payo¤-dominant or risk-dominant equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain experimental design and the pro-
cedures. In Section 3, we present the results of our experiment. We conclude in Section 4. All
supplementary material, including the instructions for the experiment, are presented in the Appen-
dix.
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2 Experimental Design and Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the FEAS Behavioral and Experimental Economics Laboratory
(BEL) at the Middle East Technical University (METU). Subjects were recruited by e-mail using
the BEL database, which consists of undergraduate students at METU. Overall, 144 subjects
participated in the experiment. There were twelve sessions and each lasted 45 minutes. Each subject
participated in only one session. All sessions were computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Throughout the experiment, payo¤s were described in terms of tokens. 100 tokens correspond
to one Turkish Lira (TL) in our experimental design. A subject earned 14.92 TL on average,
including a 5 TL participation fee.5 The experiment for the baseline consisted of two stages and
the treatments were three stages.6
In the rst stage, we elicited the risk attitude of each subject by Holt and Laurys (2002)
method. According to this method, subjects must choose one of two lotteries available for ten
di¤erent situations (Figure 2 in Appendix A). In Situation 1, the less-risky lottery (Option A) has
a higher expected payo¤ than the more-risky one (Option B). Hence, only very strong risk lovers
pick Option B in this situation. Moving further down the table in Figure 2, the expected payo¤
di¤erence between the lotteries in Option A and in Option B decreases and eventually turns negative
in Situation 5. In Situation 10, all subjects must choose between a sure payo¤ of 400 tokens (Option
A) and a sure payo¤ of 770 tokens (Option B). Since all rational individuals prefer the latter one
in the last situation, by then all subjects should have switched from Option A to Option B. In this
experiment, a consistent subject should switch from Option A to Option B just once. However,
earlier experiments using Holt and Laurys (2002) method showed that some subjects may go back
and forth between Option A and Option B. To prevent such behavior in our experiment, we asked
subjects when they want to switch from Option A to Option B.
The payo¤s for the lottery choices in the experiment were selected so that the risk threshold
point7 would provide an interval estimate of a subjects constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
With these payo¤s, it is optimal for a risk-neutral subject to switch from Option A to Option B in
Situation 5. Similarly, it is optimal for a risk-averse (risk-loving) subject to switch from Option A
5As of January 2016, the minimum wage rate is 8.13 TL per hour in Turkey.
6The instructions in a session were read in two groups: rst instructions for the rst stage is read then instructions
for the second and third stage were read together. Full instructions for the stages of costless risk-group signalling can
be found in the Appendix.
7The situation at which a subject switches from Option A to Option B.
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to Option B after (before) Situation 5. The payment for this stage was determined according to a
randomly chosen row among these ten situations and the subjects lottery choice in that particular
row. Subjects learned their earnings from this stage at the end of the experiment.
The second stage di¤ered according to the treatment. There were three treatments in our
experiment: Baseline, costless risk-group signalling, and costless action signaling. We used between-
subject design for the experiment. In baseline (No Communication) treatment, subjects played the
one-shot stag hunt game in Table 2 for 12 periods. Each period, participants were anonymously and
randomly re-matched, played the one-shot game, and saw the results of that period. However, they
did not learn the identity or history of their opponents at any time during the experiment. Subjects
were paid according to a randomly-drawn periods payo¤ for the experiment, in all treatments.
In costless risk-group signalling (Type Message) treatment the subject group was divided into
two: one group was composed of senders and the other group was composed receivers. In each
period, before playing the game in Table 2, senders had the option of not sending a message or
sending a message about which of the three groups she belonged to according to her choices in the
rst stage. If the sender switched from Option A to Option B in situations 1, 2, 3, and 4 in the
rst stage, she was actually in Group 1; if she switched from Option A to Option B in situations
5, 6 and 7 in the rst stage, she was actually in Group 2, and if she switched from Option A to
Option B in situations 8, 9 and 10 in the rst stage, she was actually in Group 3. The receivers
were told that independent of which group senders are, senders could send any message. Either the
message sent or not, subjects played the game in Table 2 in the third stage. Subjects repeated the
described game 12 periods with new matches by keeping their roles during the whole session.8
In costless action signalling (Action Message) treatment the subject group was again divided
into two: one group was composed of senders and the other group was composed receivers. In each
period, before playing the game in Table 2, senders had the option of not sending a message or
sending a message about which action he would choose in the third stage: "Action A" or "Action B".
The receivers were told that senders can send a message, "Action A" or "Action B", independent
of their action choices in the third stage. Either the message sent or not, subjects played the game
in Table 2 in the third stage. Subjects repeated the described game 12 periods with new matches
by keeping the same roles during the whole session. The possible messages in the treatments are
summarized in Table 3.
8They remain as sender or receiver during a whole session.
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Table 3: Messages in Treatments
Type Action
Group 1(Risk-Loving Group) Action A (Safe Action)
Group 2 (Medium Risk-Averse Group) Action B (Risky Action)
Group 3 (High Risk-Averse Group) 
3 Results
In this section, we rst check how the frequency of risky action choice, coordination rate (co-
ordination both under risk-dominant and payo¤-dominant equilibrium) and coordination on the
payo¤-dominant equilibrium changes as treatments change. In Table 4, we summarize these fre-
quencies under the Baseline (with no communication), Type-Message Treatment (when subjects are
allowed to announce their risk group) and Action-Message Treatment (when subjects are allowed to
announce which action they would choose in the game). As can be seen from the rst two columns
of the table, frequency of risky action choice (30% and 27% respectively), coordination rate (61%
and 66% respectively) and coordination rate on the payo¤-dominant equilibrium (11% and 9%
respectively) are very similar under the Baseline and Type-Message Treatment. 9 However, these
rates in the Action-Message Treatment are higher than the rates in the Baseline and Type-Message
treatments. In particular, we do not see a welfare-enhancing e¤ect of allowing agents to send their
types (indirect messages) to their opponents compared to baseline. However, allowing agents to
send which action they will choose in the game (direct messages) raises the coordination on the
payo¤-dominant from 11% to 67%.10
Table 4: Frequency of Risky-Action Choice and Coordination according to Treatments
Baseline Type-Message Action-Message
Treatment Treatment
Frequency of risky action choice 30% 27% 73%
Coordination rate 61% 66% 86%
Coordination rate on the 11% 9% 67%
payo¤-dominant equilibrium
9They are not signicantly di¤erent according to t-test for two sample proportions.
10The proportions in baseline and Action-Message treatments are signicantly di¤erent according to t-test for two
sample proportions.
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We also check what a¤ects a subjects likelihood of choosing risky action. To this end, we coded
our dependent variable as a bivariate one which takes the value 1 if a subject chooses Action B
(the risky action) in a given round and 0 if he or she chooses Action B (the safe action). Then,
we ran marginal e¤ect probit regression analyses with the gender, level of risk aversion, number
of prior rounds in which he or she played the game, and the treatment (Treatment variable takes
value 1 if the data come from Type-Message Treatment, 0 if the data come from Baseline). In the
random e¤ects probit regression analysis, standard errors are clustered at the subject level. The
results are presented in Table 5. As can be seen from the table only Period (the number of prior
rounds) negatively a¤ects the probability of risky action.11
Table 5: Results on Risky-Action Choices
Results of Probit Regression
Standard Errors are Clustered at the Subject Level
Dependent Variable: Choosing the Risky Action
Independent Variables #Subjects=96
#Observations=1152
Treatment (TypeMessage=1,Baseline=0)  0:05(0:06)
Gender Indicator (Male=1, Female=0)  0:05(0:06)
First stage decision (from 1 to 10)  0:01(0:02)
Period  0:02***( 0:004)
Coe¢ cients represent marginal e¤ects at the average of independent variables
Standard Errors are in the parantheses.
***=statistically signicant at 1% level
Since the period variable a¤ects the probability of risky action choice negatively, we divide the
rst row of Table 4 into three groups, i.e., we analyze the frequency of choosing the risky action
in the rst 4 periods (Periods from 1 to 4), in the second 4 periods (periods from 5-8), and in
the third 4 periods (periods from 9 to 12). As can be seen from Table 6, although frequency
of choosing risky action decreases in the baseline and Type-Message treatment (due to subjects
11We did not run a regression with action data due to high collinearity between treatment variable and dependent
variable, risky action choice.
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losses in earlier periods, they chose the safe strategy in later periods), it increases in the Action-
Message treatment (as subjects play the game repeatedly they learn how to coordinate on the
payo¤-dominant equilibrium through their messages).
Table 6: Frequency of Risky-Action Choice Across Periods
Frequency of Baseline Type-Message Action-Message
risky-action choice Treatment Treatment
Period 1-4 36% 38% 69%
Period 5-8 30% 22% 73%
Period 9-12 23% 19% 78%
Table 7 shows how the frequency of messages and given the message, the frequency of risky
action by senders (receivers) change in the Type-Message and Action-Message treatments. Subjects
chose to send messages in Action-Message treatment (92%) more frequently than Type-Message
treatment (80%). 12This may be due to the fact that subjects believed the e¤ect of their messages,
more in Action-Message Treatment. Although the percentage of senders chosing the risky action
given they did not send a message (38%) is higher under Action-Message treatment than under
Type-Message treatment (22%), the receivers chose the risky action less often if they "did not
receive a message" under Action-Message treatment (15%) than under Type-Message treatment
(27%). This implies that although sending no message in Action-Message treatment does not mean
for the sender that he would choose the safe action, a receiver interprets it so and as a best reponse
he chooses the risky action less frequently.
An agent may expect that the likelihood of his opponents risky action choice should decrease
as his opponent becomes more risk averse. As a result, we expect the frequency of risky action
choice by senders and receivers to decrease with a message, saying that the sender belongs to a
high risk-averse group (Group 3). As seen in Table 7, on the contrary, the frequency of risky action
choice of the senders increases from 23% to 31% as they send a message saying that they belong
to Group 2 to Group 3. Nevertheless, for the receivers the frequency of risky action choice when
they receive a message with their opponents belong to Group 1 is higher (29%) than the frequency
of risky action choice when they receive a message with their opponents belong to Group 2 (23%).
This frequency for receivers does not change from Group 2 messages to Group 3 messages (23%
12This di¤erence is signicant according to t-test for two sample proportions.
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in either case). Most of the messages in Type-Message treatment belong to Group 2 and Group
3 groups (60% in total). We speculate that this is due to truth telling behavior of the subjects.
There is a vast experimental economics literature about lie aversion. We refer the reader to Erat
and Gneezy (2012), Serra-Garcia-van Damme-Potters (2012) and Agranov and Schotter (2012) for
more on this.
The percentage of subjects who chose to send "Safe Action" message in Action-Message treat-
ment is very low (12%). Among those only 6% of the senders continued to choose the risky action
despite their "Safe Action" messages. The percentage of subjects who chose to send "Risky Action"
message in Action-Message treatment is quite high (80%). Senders, sending this message chose the
risky action 86% of the time and receivers receiving this message chose the risky action 88% of the
time.
Table 7: Frequency of Messages and the Actions Given the Sent (Received) Messages
Sent (Received) Number of Messages Given the message, frequency of risky
Message Type action choice by Sender (Receiver)
No Message (Type) 59(20%) 22% (27%)
No Message (Action) 23 (8%) 38%(15%)
Group 1 58(20%) 34% (29%)
Action A 36 (12%) 6%(8%)
Group 2 77(27%) 23% (23%)
Action B 229 (80%) 86%(88%)
Group 3 94(33%) 31% (23%)
  
Our results for the case of direct messages are consistent with the literature. Charness (2000)
nds that the proportion of B signals was 95% and conditional on B signal the e¢ cient outcome is
achieved 89:5% of the cases. Clark et al. (2001) nd that the probability of a B signal was 85%
and the probability of subjects playing B was 77%. In our direct message setting the proportion
of B signals was 80% and conditional on B signal the probability of subjects playing B was 86%.
All of these papers conclude that pre-play communication have a signicant e¤ect on e¢ cient
coordination. We contribute to the existing literature on cheap talk in coordination experiments
by showing that indirect messages may be ine¤ective in increasing e¢ cient coordination as stated
by Aumanns conjecture.
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Figure 1: Frequency of Senders True, Untrue, and No Messages
Figure 1 compares the frequency of true, untrue, and no messages between Type-Message and
Action-Message treatments.13 While 84% of the time subjects announced the action they will
choose in the game truthfully, 53% of the time subjects announced the type group they belong to
truthfully. While 8% of the time subjects lied about the action they will choose in the game, 27%
of the time subjects lied about the group they belong to. When we look at the lies in Type-Message
treatment in detail, among 77 untruthful messages, 33 subjects were saying that they belong to
Group 1 while they are not; 36 subjects were saying that they belong to Group 3 while they are not;
and only 8 subjects were saying that they belong to Group 2 while they are not. This observation
shows us that subjects are strategic while telling a lie. In other words, telling their opponents they
belong to Group 2 will have the least e¤ect on a¤ecting their opponentsbeliefs. However, telling
they belong to one of the extreme groups either Group 1 or Group 3, may a¤ect their opponents
beliefs and help coordination either in payo¤-dominant or risk-dominant equilibrium. While in the
Action-Message treatment, 8% of the time subjects chose not to send any message, in Type-Message
13The truth in action-message treatment means that the message about announced action is the same as chosen
action. Nevertheless, the truth in type-message treatment means that the message about subjects risk group is the
same as the group elicited by Holt-Laury method. Hence, action message is about future, while type message is about
past.
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treatment this percentage is 20%. The jump in the frequency of "no messages" in Type-Message
treatment may stem from the belief about not being able to a¤ect the opponents beliefs through
such messages. Büyükboyac¬ (2014) shows that there is a group of subjects who believes their
opponentsaction choices are not a¤ected from their risk aversion levels. Such subjects may choose
not to send a message about their types or may choose to send unstrategic (truthful) messages
about their types.
4 Conclusion
The literature about lie aversion conrms that there is a cost of lying for agents (Erat and Gneezy,
2012; Serra-Garcia-van Damme-Potters, 2012; Agranov and Schotter, 2012). The results in this
paper may stem from the fact that the cost of lying may be higher than the di¤erence between
the payo¤ from the payo¤-dominant equilibrium and the payo¤ from the safe action. In that case,
instead of telling a strategic lie through an indirect message, agents may choose telling the truth
and coordinate on the risk-dominant equilibrium rather than telling a lie (saying that they are in
Group 1) and coordinating on the payo¤-dominant equilibrium.
Second reason why we did not see much e¤ect of type messages on coordination is that since the
type message is signalling the likelihood of the risky-action choice and there may be heterogeneity
among agents about the e¤ect of such a message on their beliefs about the opponentsrisky action
choice (Büyükboyac¬, 2014). Hence, agents may best respond to these beliefs di¤erently.
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5 Appendix: Instructions
Welcome and thank you for participating in our experiment.
We will read the instructions together. Please do not touch the keyboard for now and listen to
these instructions carefully.
This is an experiment about economic decision making. All participants will earn some money
during the experiment. The money you earn might be di¤erent from the other participants earnings.
This amount is dependent on your decisions as well as the decisions of other participants. Please
do not talk with each other during the experiment. We will have to terminate the experiment if
you violate this rule. We will now describe the experimental procedures. It is very important that
you understand all the parts. Please raise your hand if you have a question.
There will be two parts in our experiment. You will learn about these parts right before they
start. Your aim in both parts is to earn as much money as possible. At the end of the experiment,
you will learn about your total earnings from each part. Your earnings will be in tokens. 100 tokens
= 1 TL. Your total earnings will be rounded to the nearest 25 kurus. In addition to your earnings
in the experiment, you will be paid a 5TL participation fee.
PART 1
You will see a table something like this in stage 1. In this part, you will face 10 di¤erent rows.
Each row provides two options, Option A and Option B. You will slide the bar in the middle to
show which option you chose for that situation. These options are basically lotteries that indicate
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Figure 2: Instructions Part 1
your chances of winning a certain payo¤. For each row, you will be asked to choose one among
option A and option B. If you choose Option B for one row, you will have to choose this option for
the remaining rows.
For instance, consider row 1. In Row 1 Option A o¤ers 400 tokens with probability 1/10 and
320 tokens with probability 9/10. In Row 1 Option B o¤ers 770 tokens with probability 1/10 and
20 tokens with probability 9/10. Your earnings from this part will be determined as follows: First
the system will pick a number between 1 and 10. This number will tell us the row that will be used
in determining your earnings from this part.
Suppose that this number turns out to be 7 and that you have chosen option A for row 7.
The system will choose another number between 1 and 10. If this number is 7 or smaller (with
probability 7/10 ), you will earn 400 tokens. If this number is 8 or larger (with probability 3/10 ),
you will earn 320 tokens.
PART 2
You will be grouped into three according to your choices in the rst stage: Group 1: You belong
to this group if you have switched from Option A to Option B in situations 1, 2, 3, or 4 in the
rst stage, Group 2: You belong to this group if you have switched from Option A to Option B in
situations 5, 6, or 7 in the rst stage, Group 3: You belong to this group if you have switched from
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Option A to Option B in situations 8, 9, or 10 in the rst stage.
In this stage, there will be 12 periods that are similar to each other. In each period some of you
will be sender; some of you will be receiver. Each of you will keep your roles as sender or receiver
during the experiment. On the top of the screen you can see whether you will be sender or receiver
during the whole stage. In each period senders will be matched to receivers randomly. You will
not be informed about whom you were matched with at any time.
Senders can send one of the following messages before playing the game: I belong to Group
1; I belong to Group 2; I belong to Group 3or I do not want to send a message.Senders
are allowed to send any message they want regardless of in which group they are. Afterwards, You
play the following game.
Action A Action B
Action A 570; 570 570; 70
Action B 70; 570 770; 770
Your and other persons period earnings will be determined by the actions you chose in the
described game: If both you and the other person chose Action A, both of you will earn 570 tokens.
If you chose Action A but the other person chose Action B; then you will earn 570 tokens and the
other person will earn 70 tokens. If you chose Action B but the other person chose Action A; then
you will earn 70 tokens and the other person will earn 570 tokens. If both you and the other person
chose Action B, both of you will earn 770 tokens.
You will see the following information on the screen after you made your action choices. Your
and the other persons action choices,the announcement made by reds and which group actually
s/he belongs to, your earnings at that period.
Then you will start new period as explained and will be matched someone else in the new period.
At the end of the experiment, one of 12 periods will be drawn and your earnings at that period
will be counted as your earnings from the second stage. Since each period has an equal chance in
drawing, you should make your decision in each period carefully.
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